LDR 04059nmm a2200193 a 4500
003 2009-10-13 22:33:12.0
005 2009-10-13 22:33:12.0
008 060811t2006uuuupr j spa d
245 00$aHistoric Review on the 65th Infantry Regiment Court-martial$h(recurso electrónico) :$breport by the Department of Army's Center of Military History*
260 0 $aSITIO EN INTERNET :$a[s.l. :$bDepartment of Army's Center of Military History],$cAccedido el 7 de noviembre 2006.
300 $a31 p. :$bPDF.
440 $aSitio en Internet
504 $aPalabras claves: 65 de infantería, demanda, Guerra de Corea, corte marcial.
516 8 $aTexto (documento electrónico)
520 0 $aA review of the performance of the Puerto Rican 65th Infantry in the Korean War provides important insights not only into the regiment's unique problems, but also into the status of the United States Army at one of the most critical junctures in its history. They underscore the impact personnel rotation policies, racial and organizational prejudices, and small unit leaders can have on combat readiness and battlefield successes. What has been called "The Forgotten War" is thus rich in lessons the Army of today can never afford to forget if it is to succeed on the battlefields of tomorrow. · Between September 1950 and December 1951, the 65th, a Regular Army regiment since 1908, established a reputation as one of the 3rd Infantry Division's best and most dependable formations. It was well led, well trained, and highly motivated. The quality of the regiment in combat however, deteriorated rapidly in the Fall of 1952, when major failures occurred at OUTPOST KELLY and JACKSON HEIGHTS in the Chorwon Valley of North Korea. · As a result, 95 men of the regiment were court-martialed and convicted of desertion, misbehavior before the enemy, and disobeying the orders of a superior office. Although Secretary of the Army Robert Stevens moved quickly to remit the sentences and granted clemency and pardons to all those involved, the court-martials have left a lasting mark on the veterans of the 65th and the people of Puerto Rico. · A number of interrelated factors influenced the failure of the 65th, many of them related to conditions prevalent within Eighth Army and the 3rd Infantry Division. At the army level, these included a shortage of officers and NCOs, a rotation policy that removed combat-experienced leaders and soldiers and made sustained training impossible, tactical doctrine that resulted in high casualties, an artillery ammunition shortage, and declining morale. At the division level, they included poor leadership, a weak artillery brigade, and a command environment guilty of ethnic and organizational prejudice. Factors within the 65th contributed to the failure as well. They included a catastrophic shortage of NCOs, language problems, and inept leadership. That the Chinese were by then at their best only made matters worse. · The heavy cumulative effect of all these influences was simply too great for the men of the 65th to bear. In the end, the regiment, which suffered as much, if not more, from these problems than any other U.S. Infantry regiment in Korea, simply could not overcome the combination of all the factors. · The Army reconstituted the 65th as a fully integrated regiment in the Spring of 1953. By June, the regiment had redeemed itself, winning 14 Silver Stars, 23 Bronze Stars for valor, and 67 Purple Hearts in the battle for OUTPOST HARRY. The unit's colors remained in Korea until November 1954, when the regiment returned to Puerto Rico. Today, only the 1st Battalion of the 65th Infantry regiment remains as a testimony to a unique regiment that serviced the United States Army well for over a hundred years. · In all, some 61,000 Puerto Ricans served in the U.S. Army during the Korean War, the bulk of them with the 65th Infantry Regiment. Some 743 were killed and 2,318 wounded.
538 $aModo de acceso: Internet.
538 $aModo de acceso: Internet via ftp
610 0$aRegimiento 65 de Infantería